Crisis management requires rapid sharing of data among organizations responders. Existing crisis management practices rely on ad hoc or centralized data sharing based on agreements written in natural language. The ambiguity of natural language specifications often leads to errors and can hinder data availability. Therefore, it is desirable to develop automatic data sharing systems. This also presents additional challenges, such as evaluation of security constraints in different administrative domains and in situations with intermittent network connectivity. We compare two different architectural approaches to develop secure data sharing solutions. The first approach assumes reliable network connectivity, while the second approach works in ad hoc networks. We then suggest a unified architecture that caters for both scenarios.
INTRODUCTION
Crisis management often requires access to sensitive data from many organizations or different administrative domains. For example, responders from different domains may need to share medical records to provide care for the victims. We indicate the organization where data originates as the data provider and the recipient organization as the data consumer. Sensitive data must be protected according to the policies of the data provider even after it has been disseminated to users in different domains. The data provider must ensure that its data will be protected after dissemination, while the data consumer needs to know what data it will be able to access. Organizations form Data Sharing Agreements (DSA) [18] to achieve these goals, e.g., see [11] . A DSA is a signed contract stating each partner's obligations to protect data, which allows the partners to seek remedy (e.g. through legal means) for breaches of the conPermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. tract. Thus, a DSA allows the data provider to trust data consumers to enforce the agreed policies in their administrative domain.
Common practices of emergency responder agencies indicate that the evaluation and enforcement of DSAs are not automated and data is often shared informally [19] . Informal data sharing requires manual decision making. However, a manual process can cause delays and errors, which can in turn lead to deterioration of the crisis at hand. Effective and scalable crisis management requires an automated and efficient DSA evaluation and enforcement system.
Existing dissemination control architectures suffer from many limitations: 1) They require recipients to contact a pre-defined central trusted authority (TA) to obtain access rights; 2) If the TA is not available, the responders cannot access the data. If, for example, the incident happens in a tunnel. The incident response vehicles may use long range communication equipment to exchange data with the outside world, while responders may have to depend on ad hoc links using short range communication of their mobile devices. It is therefore necessary to cater for data sharing in ad hoc networks [7] ; 3) The policies are unilaterally defined by the data provider who may have poor or no knowledge of user credentials and contextual information available in the data consumer's domain. This severely restricts the expressiveness of the policies. EXAMPLE 1.1. Consider a crisis scenario where the Police collects personal and medical information of an incident's evacuees, and needs to share it with employees of Local Government (LG) to coordinate medical support for the evacuees. Following the need to know principle, only those LG employees that are assigned to the incident should be given access to the data. To specify such an access policy the Police must know how to identify employees assigned to the incident in the LG's domain. Also, the LG must understand the policy to provide matching credentials.
2 This paper presents a data sharing architecture based on the concept of DSAs that can be used both in crisis and normal situations. It caters for data access with intermittent connectivity and also enables usage control [14] , i.e., continuous control over data access. Further details of this work are also described in a longer version of this paper [9] .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related works. In Section 3 we introduce the concepts of DSA. Section 4 discusses the designs for a cross-domain data sharing architecture. An overview of our implementation is given in Section 5. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
RELATED WORK
Dissemination control architectures [15, 13, 2, 12 ] also known as Digital/Enterprise Rights Management (DRM/ERM) systems share many common design principles. The sensitive data is encrypted and associated with access policies. These policies are evaluated by a central trusted authority (TA) which issues the decryption keys (see Figure 1) . Park et al. [15] presented an analysis of several dissemination control architectures. However, they did not investigate how rights can be determined during cross-domain evaluations. Adam et al. [1] proposed use of an intermediate coordinator service in each organization, which is unusable when connectivity is absent. Since it is not feasible to use a centralized architectures, it is necessary to explore other rights distribution mechanisms.
Access Hierarchy based Encryption (AHE) [4] defines a hierarchy of access-levels. Each access-level is associated with a secret key which can be derived offline if the secret key of its parent node is known. Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) [5] is used to encrypt data using an attribute based policy and a TA's public key. The TA generates a secret key for each user based on the user's attributes so that they are able to decrypt data only if their attributes satisfy the policy used for the encryption. The attribute-based keys must be distributed apriori.
The Policy-based Authority Evaluation Scheme (PAES) [16] allows a data originator to specify a hierarchy of authorities trusted to correctly evaluate its policies. The set of authorities trusted to evaluate the usage control policies is not statically defined, but designated by a trust policy evaluated by a higher level authority. The set of higher level authorities is recursively defined by policies. The recursion terminates by a set of statically defined authorities at the root-level of the hierarchy. As a result this protocol allows recipients to choose a trusted authority in a more flexible manner.
DEFINITIONS
When an entity agrees to a DSA it promises to enforce policies ensuring such that the security requirements of the data provider are satisfied. DEFINITION 3.1. (Data Sharing Agreement) A Data Sharing Agreement is a 6-tuple (id, A, S, T, P,V ) where id is a unique identifier, A is an attribute vocabulary describing subject, data, and context attributes, S = (E, O,t s ,t e ) is the scope of the agreement, E is the set of entities signing the DSA, O is a set of conditions over data attributes that must be satisfied by data items to which this DSA is applicable, t s and t e are the start and end time of the DSA, T is a set of trusted attributes providers, P is a set of usage policies, and V is a set of violation procedures. Discussion of additional specifications such as procedures to resolve disputes, to revise the DSA etc. is outside the scope of this paper.
To provide a continuous control of usage, the policy must be reevaluated if any of the attributes change. This requires monitoring of the attributes used in access conditions. However, monitoring all attributes for a large set of documents can consume significant computing and energy resources. We observe that attributes may be either long-lived (persistent) or short-lived (volatile). For example, a user's group may be considered long-lived, whereas a user's location is short-lived as it may change frequently. Thus, we allow the policy author to clearly separate the long and short lived access conditions so that only the latter are monitored. tuple (s, o, a, c, c m ) representing a permission given to subject s to perform action a on object o, when the conditions c and c m over subject, data, and contextual attributes are satisfied. To allow access c must be satisfied at the moment of the access request, whereas c m must hold for the entire duration of the usage. This means c m must be monitored and the usage must be interrupted as soon as c m becomes false.
Although the DSA partners agree on a common vocabulary, the attributes used in the DSA may still not match with the credentials issued by the organizations. Thus, the architecture should either translate the usage policies of each DSA to a domain-specific enforceable version, or translate the credentials for each access request depending on the applicable DSA. We take the first approach because the translation needs to be done only once for each DSA. EXAMPLE 3.1. Consider a DSA between the Police and a Local Government that restricts access to personal data of an incident victim to responders assigned to that incident. Moreover, access must be allowed only while the responder is in an area designated as level1. Figure 2 shows an enforceable policy for the Police domain after translation of the DSA. The policy declares the persistent and volatile attributes, credential types, authorities, credentials, roles, and authorizations. Authority P is declared by specifying the identifier of its credential service. Credentials are defined as instances of credential types issued by a trusted authority. Roles are declared by specifying a condition over the credentials users may possess. Finally, a subject with role "responder" is authorized to read data items of category "personal". The monitored condition is expressed in the while clause, and other access conditions are specified in the when clause. 
ARCHITECTURE
Sensitive data must always be encrypted when stored or transmitted to force all access through a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). Only the PEP should be able to obtain decryption keys when permitted by a trusted Policy Decision Point (PDP). We first discuss architectures based on whether users can interact with other entities to receive decryption keys after or before receiving protected data. We then present a unified architecture combining their benefits.
Interactive Data Sharing Architecture
In the Interactive Data Sharing Architecture (IDSA) recipients interact with their organization's server to obtain access after receiving the protected data. A DSA establishes trust which allows the data consumer to evaluate users in its domain, i.e., it allows translation of a DSA into policies enforceable by the DSA partners. IDSA does not however cater for data access when connectivity is intermittent.
To evaluate the policies, the PDP needs to identify the data for which access is requested. Content-based rules cannot be applied because the PEP is not yet able to decrypt the data. To overcome this problem, it is necessary to package metadata with the protected data. The metadata must be signed for protection against unauthorized modifications. We here assume the metadata is specified as Let k denote a symmetric encryption key (content key), {D} k the data D encrypted with k, and M the metadata. PK e and PK −1 e denote the public and private keys of an entity e. We assume that all messages are signed by their senders. A protocol (see Figure 3(a) ) for securely sharing D between Bob of organization A and Charles of organization B can then be described as follows: IDSA extends existing ERM models (e.g. [12] ) for cross-domain operation and also allows more expressive policies. Other differences include the use of metadata for policy-evaluation, and distribution of policy evaluation authorities based on a DSA.
Non-Interactive Data Sharing Architecture
In the Non-Interactive Data Sharing Architecture (NIDSA) users can obtain decryption keys before receiving protected data. A user can use the same keys to access any document for which he has permissions.
In NIDSA, data is protected using public keys of groups defined in a DSA. The users obtain the group private keys they are authorized to possess before data is received. Let K
−1 g(Bob)
and K
−1 g(Charles)
be the set of private group keys that Bob and Charles possess. Each user u has its own public-private key pair (PK u , PK −1 u ), and each group g has a public-private key pair (k g , k −1 g ). A protocol for securely sharing data D using NIDSA (see Figure 3(b) ) can be described as follows:
, p} PK BobPEP Server B → Charles : {K −1 g(Charles)
, p} PK CharlesPEP 3. Bob → Charles :
Charles is authorized to access data if k g ∈ K −1 g(Charles)
. The usage control policy p still needs to be enforced locally. For example, to restrict access based on contextual conditions. Note that in NIDSA the recipient obtains access keys (step 2) before dissemination while in IDSA the recipient obtains the access keys (step 5) after dissemination.
NIDSA can be implemented using ABE [5] . Possession of an attribute in ABE is comparable to possession of a group private key in NIDSA. However, existing ABE schemes are computationally very intensive for mobile devices that responders need to use. NIDSA can also be implemented using AHE [4] by considering k g = k −1 g , and each access-level in AHE as a group in NIDSA. The data must be protected with a key that the authorized recipients can derive. However, cross-domain data sharing will require a cross-domain access hierarchy.
In NIDSA, revocation is hard to achieve because it requires a key renewal as revoked users already have decryption keys. Alternatively, policies need to be updated to deny permissions to revoked users. In an IDSA architecture, revocation checks can be done at the organization's servers as the recipients must request permissions for each protected item.
Unified cross-domain Data Sharing Architecture (UDSA)
While NIDSA caters for crisis management requirements, it is still desirable to use IDSA during normal operation. Therefore, a comprehensive data sharing solution must unify NIDSA and IDSA. Similarly to NIDSA, users in UDSA are assigned to different groups and each group has a public-key and a private-key. We assume that each responder has a device capable of short-range wireless communication (e.g., a smart phone). We also assume that the persistent user credentials and the public keys of all DSA partners are already stored on the user's device.
Unlike NIDSA, the group keys are generated on a per-incident basis in UDSA. We assume one of the incident response vehicles acts as an initial source for creating and distributing keys. The responders exchange data, keys, and certificates when they come into communication range of each other. This communication together with their mobility in the incident area, allows them to cope with intermittent network connectivity (see Figure 4) .
The ad hoc distribution of rights in form of private-keys of groups is controlled by policies, inspired by PAES [16, 17] . PAES can be used in crisis management by allowing responders to act as authorities. The access evaluation protocol is similar to IDSA with three exceptions 1) it can also occur between responders, 2) group keys are given instead of content key, and 3) metadata is not used in the protocol.
UDSA Components
The PEP comprises the application and a Data Protection Object API (DPOAPI). The DPOAPI provides a common set of functionalities including cryptographic functions and interactions with the PDP. The application is responsible for intercepting access requests and shares the responsibility to enforce access decisions with the DPOAPI. A user must contact a trusted policy evaluation authority such as a server or a trusted peer to obtain a use-license. In addition to content/group keys, a use-license contains usage control policies to be evaluated and enforced locally and a license expiration date.
Obtaining A Use-License
A use-license evaluation in the NIDSA depends only on the userattributes while in the IDSA it also depends on the metadata. This knowledge allows us to design policy and enforcement components that can also be used in ad hoc mode. Collection of all possible credentials for evaluation of a request can be time consuming. Thus, the PDP in USDA can be queried for the credentials needed to evaluate a user's request. The credential requirements (CRs) are expressed as pairs (credential type, issuer), where an issuer is the authority trusted to specify values for the credential type. For example, (Authentication, "police") is a CR for the policy shown in Figure 2 . We allow the PIP to cache credentials for offline use. The cache duration depends on whether the certified attribute is persistent or volatile. The PDP of peer/server then evaluates the DSA's policies and user credentials to determine whether a use-license can be given to the user (see Figure 5 ). The optional parameters are marked with (*) in the figure.
Usage Control
To support usage control the PDP subscribes (via PIP) to receive notification about changes in the monitored attributes, from the local or remote attribute authorities (see Figure 6 ). In ad hoc mode the authorities should be reachable using opportunistic routing. The PDP is session-aware and keeps track of sessions that need to be reevaluated when an attribute changed event is received. If the permissions of a user change during a session, a permission changed event is sent to the PEP, which then terminates the ongoing accesses.
Discussion
In general, when users have complete privileges on their devices, it is necessary to rely on the trusted computing (TC) technology [8] to ensure secrecy of the keys and the integrity of the security system. However, in case of responder agencies or large corporations the user privileges are often well managed. In such cases, these goals can be met by carefully restricting user access.
A pragmatic data protection mechanism for crisis management should allow a responder to override the security policies to access data in high risk situations. Implementation of such break-the-glass security mechanism should be accompanied with the creation of an activity log that can be reviewed later.
IMPLEMENTATION
The UDSA architecture has been tested with development of two UDSA-aware applications. The PDP components of the architecture were developed at Imperial College London, and the PEP and PIP were developed at the European Microsoft Innovation Center (EMIC). The PDP for end-user devices has been implemented as a Java library, and the server-side PDP is exposed as a Java web service. The DPOAPI and PIP are implemented using C#. Interoperability between Java and C# components is achieved using JNBridge [10] . The two applications demonstrate use of the architecture in different scenarios. The first application provides secure access to XML documents containing information about an incident. It allows us to restrict the access to selected parts of the document. In addition, the access can be restricted based on the user's location, role, and status of the incident. User's location is determined by triangulation of wifi tags (Aeroscout tags [3] ) carried by the user. The user's identity and location credentials are issued by a security token service (STS) implemented using the Geneva Framework [6] . The second application instead provides secure access to sensitive scientific data in a typical enterprise scenario.
CONCLUSIONS
The proposed architectures provide secure data sharing based on DSAs. In addition, usage control can be enforced in adhoc networks. Moreover, it is possible to use UDSA for scenarios with and without reliable network connectivity. The UDSA architecture achieves this goal by using distributed policy evaluation and establishing the required trust relationships using DSAs.
